Supporting methods
In preparing the experimental protocol for the present study, we envisioned three separate treatments: (i) a control treatment with the well-mixed interactions (CD), (ii) a treatment with players arranged in a static network (CD2), and (iii) a static network treatment with punishment (CDP2). To conduct these treatments, we reserved professionally designed computer laboratories at two Chinese universities: Tianjin University of Finance and Economics and Yunnan University of Finance and Economics. Undergraduate volunteers who participated in the experiment were recruited from these same universities. To avoid any form of reciprocal associations, we mixed students from different majors who typically have minimal class overlap. Overall, we secured participation from 140 natural and 85 social science students. Details on the experiment were kept secret during the recruitment phase. Students were only asked to show up at the computer labs at the appointed date and time.
The whole experiment was equally divided between six separate sessions, i.e., two sessions per treatment (Table S1 ). These sessions were characterized by the following practical considerations:
• To obtain as much data as possible before participants started to lose concentration, the number of interactions in each session was set to 50, which took about one hour to complete. The number of interactions was undisclosed until the sessions ended.
• The upper bound on the number of participants was set by three limitations: (i) recruitment opportunities, (ii) limited space at computer laboratories, and (iii) software scalability with the increasing number of players. Although the used computer laboratories consist of nearly 100 cubicles, we found that occupying every second cubicle is optimal for preventing chatter. Furthermore, testing revealed that having more than approximately 50 participants reached the limit of z-Tree software scalability, causing a considerable slowdown in program execution. Finally, recruiting around 30 to 40 students proved feasible even on a relatively short notice. Gathering more than 40 students at a time would require a coordinated effort of more technical staff than we had at our disposal.
• We tried to secure an equal number of female and male participants to avoid a potential gender bias in the results.
Once participants showed up at the designated computer laboratories, they were assigned an isolated cubicle at random. One supervisor then presented the basic information on the experimental procedures and the instructions on how to play the repeated Prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. Thereafter participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire designed to test their understanding of the rules laid out by the supervisor (Fig. S1 ). Answering the questionnaire correctly was required to participate in the game; the protocol envisioned that anyone who failed to provide the correct answers would receive a show-up fee of ¥15 and be dismissed before the game began.
At least four supervisors were present at all times during a session. These supervisors played a dual role; they maintained order in the computer laboratories and addressed any questions or technical problems encountered by participants. At the end of each session, supervisors had to convert game scores into monetary payouts. To that end, participants were endowed with an initial score of 50 points which was subsequently updated after every round according to the payoff matrix in Eq. (1). The final score was converted into the Chinese renminbi at a rate of ¥0.5 per point. Note that negative scores were also possible, in which case participants would still receive the show-up fee. The described setting resulted in the following payouts:
• In the well-mixed treatment (CD), the average payout was ¥54.7, ranging from ¥15 to ¥80.
• In the static network (CD2), the average payout was ¥80.4, ranging from ¥24 to ¥148.
• In the static network with punishment (CDP2), the average payout was ¥57.4, ranging from ¥15 to ¥137.
In presenting the game rules to participants, a particular care was taken to avoid any framing effects. For instance, actions C, D, and P were named simply "1", "2", and "3", and explained in terms of the unilateral payoff matrix appearing in Eq. (1). The computer interface for playing the game contained the same explanation as a constant reminder of what choices "1", "2", and "3" stand for (Fig. S2) . In this way, we aimed to prevent the positive connotations of the word "cooperation" or the negative connotations of the words "defection" and "punishment" to affect the results of the experiment. The schematic representation of the networks of interactions among participants is reported in Fig. S3 .
Supporting results
Clustering. What is the mechanism by which network reciprocity manages to increase the level of cooperation? We find direct evidence that the cooperation-promoting effect of network reciprocity can be attributed to clustering (Fig. S4) . Namely, in the well-mixed interactions, initial cooperativeness can be relatively high, but in about ten rounds of transient dynamics, the level of cooperation becomes dismally low (Fig. 2) . The problem seems to be that prospective cooperators fail to identify other cooperators and, apart for rare unyielding individuals, abandon cooperation in favor of defection (Fig. S4A ). In the static network, by contrast, prospective cooperators seem to locate one another fairly quickly and become the "islands" of persistent mutual cooperation throughout an experimental session (Fig. S4B ). Punishment appears to have little effect on clustering (Fig. S4C ). The occasional use of punishment is observed among defectors or at the edges of cooperative clusters, but in either case a consistent improvement in cooperativeness is missing. Punishment neither creates new cooperative clusters nor helps increase the size of the existing ones.
To truly pin down the cooperation-promoting effect of network reciprocity to clustering, we need to confirm that clusters are relatively stable in time. We examined two characteristics, the number of clusters and the size of the maximum cluster, both as a function of time averaged over all sessions of a given treatment. The results reveal that static networks stabilize these two cluster characteristics (Fig. S5 ). Although the number of clusters exhibits a slightly decreasing trend, the overall goodness of fit in the treatment without punishment (CD2) is insufficient to distinguish the data from a random scatter (Fig. S5A) . A more conclusive result is obtained by considering the size of the maximum cluster ( Fig. S5B ) which shows no statistically significant trend even in the presence of punishment (CDP2). That clusters are relatively stable in time affirms the conclusions from the main text reached by considering assortment because these two concepts are closely related.
Larger neighborhood size.
To test the effects of neighborhood size on the level of cooperation in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game described herein, we conducted additional experimental sessions in which four individuals, instead of two, acted as the first neighbors. One session (CD; 16 Oct 2016; 36 players; mean age 20.5; SD age 1.0) consisted only of wellmixed interactions, one session was played in the static network (CD4; 17 Oct 2016; 34 players; mean age 20.1; SD age 0.73), while the remaining two sessions, in addition to being played in the static network, allowed participants to punish each other (CDP4; 13 & 20 Nov 2016; 35 & 29 players; mean age 21.1 & 21.4; SD age 0.89 & 0.59). The results indicate similar qualitative properties as the sessions with two neighbors, but with important quantitative differences (cf. Fig. 1 vs. Fig. S6) .
A qualitatively similar result that holds for both smaller and larger neighborhood size is that network reciprocity promotes cooperation. Specifically, the recorded level of cooperation in CD is M = 2.0% with IQR = 4.0% which is significantly lower than M = 9.0% with IQR = 26% in CD4 (z-score -2.956; two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test p = 0.003). Punishment once again had no effect on cooperativeness because M = 9.4% with IQR = 15% in CDP4 is statistically indistinguishable from the outcome of CD4 (z-score -0.2799; two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test p = 0.779).
A quantitatively important difference between smaller and larger neighborhoods is that network reciprocity weakens with neighborhood size. Comparing the level of cooperation in CD2 and CD4, we find that cooperativeness is much lower in the latter case (z-score 4.852; two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test p < 10 −5 ). By extension, an analogous result holds when comparing CDP2 and CDP4 (z-score 6.496; two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test p < 10 −9 ).
That network reciprocity weakens with increasing neighborhood size is seen not only from the level of cooperation, but also from the manner in which success in terms of the payoff per round correlates with cooperativeness. In CD2 cooperation is a well-adjusted action because the payoff per round correlated positively with the use of cooperation. This is no longer the case in CD4 (Fig. S7A) , although network reciprocity does make the situation better than in the well-mixed control treatment (CD) in which cooperation is a maladjusted action. The full extent to which network reciprocity weakens with an increasing neighborhood size is seen in the presence of punishment. Specifically, in CDP2 cooperation was still a well-adjusted strategy despite somewhat lower slope of the regression line than in CD2, but in CDP4, the correlation between the payoff per round and the use of cooperation turns negative indicating that this action is maladjusted. Such negative correlation makes it impossible to associate cooperation with success, meaning that an incentive to select cooperation over other actions is missing. In fact, by playing the game for a prolonged period of time, participants should learn to associate defection with success because this is a well-adjusted action in CDP4 (Fig. S7B) . As for punishment, a questionable negative correlation in CDP2 is replaced with a statistically significant one in CDP4 (Fig. S7C) , confirming yet again the "winner's don't punish effect" found in Refs. (31, 32).
Region as a confounding factor. In conducting the present experiment, we relied on computer laboratories from two distant Chinese cities, Tianjin and Kunming. Tianjin is a metropolis located in northern coastal Mainland China that bears the status of one of the five national central cities. As such, Tianjin has the highest per capita GDP in China, topping both Beijing and Shanghai. Kunming, by contrast, belongs to Southwest China and is a prefecture-level city with an urban population roughly one third the size of Tianjin's population. Although an important regional economic center, Kunming has per capita GDP that is about 50% lower than in Tianjin. Because it is conceivable that geographic separation and the degree of economic development affect human behavior, we test whether in our experiment region is an important confounding factor.
We analyze the differences in the behavior of participants from Tianjin and Kunming by means of contingency tables (Table S2 ). Statistical analyses shows that in the static network (CD2) participants from Tianjin and Kunming behave in an indistinguishable manner. Upon introducing punishment (CDP2), one significant difference becomes apparent. Namely, participants from Tianjin (Kunming) use punishment far less (more) than expected. A large contribution of this action to the total value of the chi-squared statistic indicates that punishment alone is responsible for the statistically significant result in CDP2, while the use of cooperation and defection remains equal irrespective of the city in which experimental sessions were conducted.
Gender as a confounding factor. Gender is another plausible confounding factor that may have affected the results of the present experiment. To examine the role of gender, we use contingency tables similarly as above (Table S3) . Statistical analyses show that irrespective of the availability of punishment, both female and male participants act in an indistinguishable manner. Gender, therefore, has no effect on the overall results presented herein.
Academic background as a confounding factor. Another potential confounding factor for which we had sufficient data to perform statistical tests is academic background (Table S4) . Students who participated in our experiment could roughly be divided between those who major in mathematics or natural sciences (abbreviated M&NS) and those who major in humanities or social sciences (H&SS). The results show that in the static network (CD2), M&NS students were significantly less cooperative and more likely to defect than H&SS students. With the introduction of punishment (CDP2), cooperativeness of M&NS (H&SS) students remained below (above) what would be expected if behavior was entirely random. Although defection was now equally likely between the two groups, M&NS students were more likely to resort to punishment than H&SS students. These results are consistent with the onymous treatment in Ref. (31), indicating that H&SS students embrace cooperative behavior more easily than M&NS students when some sort of a cooperation-promoting mechanism is at work. The results furthermore suggest that control for academic background may be necessary before drawing general conclusions from the data obtained in social dilemma experiments. Fig. S1 . Snapshot of the questionnaire used to test the basic understanding of the game rules. An English translation is as follows. A, In this PD game (see payoff matrix 1), you and your two opponents all need to choose an action at the same time. Your action affects both opponents equally. Assuming that your current payoff is 30, if you choose "1" (marked by a red circle below), while your opponents choose "1" and "2", you earn ______ in the current round. Your total payoff becomes ______ after this round. B, Assume the same situation as in the problem above with the exception that there are now three actions available (see payoff matrix 2). If you choose "2" (marked by a red circle), while your opponents choose "3" and "1", you earn ______ in the current round. Your total payoff becomes ______ after this round. S3. Schematic representation of how participants interacted in the different treatments. A, In the well-mixed interactions (CD), connections between participants were randomly reshuffled after every round. B, In the static network (CD2 and CDP2) connections between participants remained unchanged throughout the game. Fig. S4 . Clustering is the underlying, cooperation-promoting mechanism behind network reciprocity. A, In the well-mixed interactions (CD), initially cooperative individuals are unable to locate other cooperators and, consequently, their willingness to cooperate quickly dwindles. After about 10 rounds, cooperation is chosen sporadically at best, except by lone persistent cooperators. B, In the static network (CD2), initially cooperative individuals have a chance of locating cooperative neighbors and thus creating a stable cluster of cooperators (recognizable as the horizontally stretched blue stripes). Sometimes a cluster forms in later rounds of the experiment, in previously defecting neighborhoods. C, When punishment is introduced (CDP2), stable cooperative clusters form similarly as in CD2. However, cluster formation cannot be linked to the use of punishment. This action is mostly used at the edges of already existing cooperative clusters or in defecting neighborhoods, but without an obvious success in turning defectors into cooperators. Fig. S4 , panel B (CD2) and panel C (CDP2). In both cases the number of clusters seems to be slowly decreasing in time, but the goodness of fit in CD2 is statistically indistinguishable from zero. B, The maximum cluster size as a percentage of the total network size is stable in both CD2 and CDP2. The apparent negative slope in CD2 is statistically indistinguishable from zero, as is the overall goodness of fit. Fig. S6 . Network reciprocity weakens in a larger-size neighborhood. Pairwise comparisons indicate that network reciprocity (CD4) effectively increases the frequency of cooperation and decreases the frequency of defection relative to the well-mixed interactions (CD) even if the static network's neighborhood size increases from two to four. However, the cooperation-promoting effect is much weaker now. Introducing punishment (CDP4) once again has no effect on the frequency of cooperation beyond the level established by network reciprocity. Punishment is still used seldomly, most often as a substitute for defection. Box-and-whisker plots with notches characterize the empirical distribution of action frequencies. Box height determines the interquartile range, while the horizontal lines in-between represent the median. Notches make visual pairwise comparisons possible by indicating the 95% confidence intervals for the median. Whisker height is such that 99.3% of normally distributed data would be within the whisker-defined range. Points outside of this range are drawn as outliers. Fig. S7 . Cooperativeness is no longer awarded with success in a larger-size neighborhood. A, Cooperation is a maladjusted action when the interactions are well-mixed (CD) because the corresponding payoff per round correlates negatively with the frequency of cooperation. Network reciprocity (CD4) improves the situation, but fails to establish a positive correlation between the payoff and cooperation. After introducing punishment (CDP4), any sign of improvement disappears and cooperation is again maladjusted. B, Defection is a mirror image of cooperation in both CD and CD4. The same is only approximately true in CDP4 because punishment is occasionally used as a replacement for defection. C, Unlike in the smaller-size neighborhood, punishment is now a clearly maladjusted action as indicated by the negative correlation between the payoff per round and the frequency of punishment. Table S1 . Basic information on the conducted experimental sessions. A total of six sessions was divided between three treatments. Sessions were characterized by the number of interactions, attendance, the mean age of participants and its standard deviation, and the percentage of women. Table S4 . Contingency tables for academic background as a confounding factor. Each treatment is represented by its own separate contingency table with the following information: the observed cell totals, (the expected cell totals), and [the χ 2 statistic for each cell]. In the static network (CD 2 ), students who major in mathematics and natural sciences (M&NS) behave significantly different from students who major in humanities and social sciences (H&SS), with the latter group being more cooperative and less prone to defection (χ 2 = 74.48; chi-squared test p < 10 −9 ). When punishment is introduced (CDP 2 ), H&SS students remain more cooperative and, although the level of defection is now almost the same between the two groups, H&SS students are less likely to resort to punishment (χ 2 = 13.99; chi-squared test p = 0.001). 
Supporting figures

Supporting tables
